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Social Contagion of Violence

Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson, and Garth Davies

Introduction
Like many large American cities, New York
City experienced a sudden and dramatic
increase in homicides beginning in 1985 .
The homicide run-up was highest for adolescents, but rates increased quickly for older
persons as well (Fsagan, Zimring, & Kim,
1998). Unlike many other cities, in which
homicides declined gradually over the next
decade yet remained above their pre-1985
levels, the increase in New York was followed by an even larger decline over the
next 5 years. By 1995 , homicide in New
York City had dropped below its 1985 level;
by 1996, it was lower than the 1985 rates;
by 1998, homicide rates were 25 % lower
than the 1985 levels; and by 1998, homicide rates were lower than three decades
earlier. The drop in crime generally, and
not just homicide, was an order of magnitude greater than any observed in large
American cities since the 195 0s (Zimring,
2007).
Explanations of this roller-coaster pattern of violence beginning in the 1960s
have tended to partition the periods of

increase and decline as distinct phenomena with unique causes. Moreover, these
causes are typically regarded as exogenous
to the people or areas affected. For example, the onset and severity of the homicide
trend were attributed to the sudden emergence of unstable street-level crack markets, with high levels of violence between
sellers (Baumer, 1994; Baumer, Lauritsen,
Rosenfeld, & Wright, 1998; Fagan & Chin,
1991; Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, & Murphy, 2005 ;
Grogger & Willis, 2000). Others suggested
that drug markets created a demand for guns
that in turn trickled down from drug sellers into the hands of adolescents (Blumstein, 1995 ; Fagan, 1992). Structural theorists
implicated race-specific economic deficits in
inner cities (Krivo & Peterson, 2000; Peterson & Krivo, 1993 ) or racial residential segregation (Massey, 1995 ). There have been
many claims regarding the sources of the
decline, including changes in police strategy (Kelling & Cole, 1996), demographic
changes (Cook & Laub, 1998; Eckberg,
1995 ), incarceration (Blumstein & Beck,
1999), and lower demand for illegal drugs
(Curtis, 1998).
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None of the popular explanations of
either the increase or the decline is fully satisfying. Moreover, the gap between the scale
of demographic and policy changes and the
scale of the crime decline suggests that there
are processes at work other than these usual
suspects. Some have used the term “epidemic” metaphorically to describe the homicide run-up and decline, but with little precision and often conflating several features
of epidemics, such as social concentration,
spatial diffusion, and temporal spikes (see,
for example, Bailey, 1975 ).
Epidemic is a term used widely in
the popular and scientific literature to
describe two quite separate components of
a phenomenon: an elevated incidence of the
phenomena and its rapid spread via a contagious process within a population in a
short period of time. For example, Gladwell
(2000) describes how the incidence of an
ordinary and stable phenomenon such as a
seasonal flu can become epidemic when its
incidence increases in a very short time from
a predictable base rate to an elevated rate
of infections. Moreover, epidemics need not
be contagious. Consider an outbreak of food
poisoning from contaminated materials or a
cancer cluster near a polluted water supply.
These medical problems may occur at a rate
well above an expected base rate, but are
not spread from person to person through
physical contact or an infectious process. In
contrast, an outbreak of influenza, the adaptation of cultural fads, medical or industrial
innovation, or changes in the rates of antisocial behavior all reflect spread through interpersonal exposure to an “infectious” agent.
Although disease spreads through a host
and agent (Robertson, 1990; Rothman,
1986), social contagion involves the mutual
influence of individuals within social networks who turn to each other for cues and
behavioral tools that reflect the contingencies of specific situations (Bailey, 1967; Burt,
1987; Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966). The
contagious dimension is especially salient
during the upswing of an epidemic, when
physical or social contact is critical to spread
pursuant to exposure. But epidemics also
end, as the rate of new incidence of the phe-
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nomenon declines. This decline may occur
because the density of contacts may decrease
or because some form of resistance develops
that reduces the odds of transmission from
one person to the next, even in the presence of exogenous contributing factors (Bailey, 1967; Burt, 1992).
In this chapter, we assess whether the
roller-coaster pattern of homicides in New
York City beginning in 1985 fits a contagion model and identify mechanisms of
social contagion that predict its spread across
social and physical space. This framework
for interpreting the homicide trends as an
epidemic includes two perspectives. First,
the sharp rise and fall are indicative of a
nonlinear pattern in which the phenomenon
spreads at a rate far beyond what would
be predicted by exposure to some external factor and declines in a similar pattern
in which the reduction from year to year
exceeds what might be expected by linear
regression trends. This leads to the second
perspective: the factors leading to its spread
are not exogenous factors, as in the case of
contamination or disaster. Instead, the nonlinear increase and decline suggest that the
phenomenon is endemic to the people and
places where its occurrence is highest and
that this behavior may be effectively passed
from one person to another through some
process of contact or interaction.
We assess the validity of these assumptions in three ways. In the section “Violence
as Social Contagion,” we introduce a framework of social contagion that informs this
analysis. The diffusion and spread of social
behaviors are recurring themes in both the
scientific and popular literatures. But there
has been little theorizing on the mechanisms
of social diffusion generally and specifically
on the social interactions that may qualify
as a contagious process. This section reviews
the literature generally on social contagion
and then constructs an analytic framework
to explain the spread of youth violence over
time and space. In the section “The Epidemiology of Youth Homicide in New York City,”
we analyze Vital Statistics data from the
New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene to construct simple time
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series data that characterize the increase and
decline in homicides from 1985 –2000. We
concentrate on homicides involving adolescents and young adults, populations who
experienced the sharpest rise and decline in
homicide, both in New York and nationally
(Cook & Laub, 1998; Fagan & Davies, 2004;
Fagan et al., 1998).
In the section “Neighborhood Effects
on Social Contagion of Youth Homicide,”
we estimate models to identify the spatial and social trends in youth homicide.
Using growth curve or hierarchical models, we disaggregate homicide and nonlethal injury data by neighborhoods over
the 11-year period and fit models to demonstrate the spatial diffusion of youth homicide from one neighborhood to the next
across New York City. By co-varying neighborhood social and economic characteristics
with temporal homicide trends, we are able
to show that the diffusion of homicide in this
era was specific to the most socially isolated
areas of the city. We isolate gun homicides
as the contagious agent, showing that it is
gun homicides that diffused across New York
City neighborhoods and that gun homicides
retreated just as quickly.
In the section “Violent Events, Social Networks, and Social Contagion,” we present
data from interviews with young males
active in gun violence during this time. Their
reports of the role of guns in violent events
further specify how diffusion may in fact be
the result of a dynamic process of social contagion. We conclude the chapter by integrating these perspectives into a unifying
framework that links elements of models of
infectious disease with social interactionist
perspectives to explain the social contagion
that contributed to New York City’s homicide epidemic, which remains today as the
source of contentious debates in public policy and social science.

Violence As Social Contagion
Background
There are many examples of social contagion that inform the development of

this research, especially among adolescents:
trends in fashion and art (Gladwell, 2000),
as well as problematic social behaviors,
such as alcohol and drug use (Rowe &
Rodgers, 1994), smoking (Rowe & Rodgers,
1991), teenage pregnancy (Crane, 1991), suicide (Berman, 1995 ; Gould, Wallenstein, &
Kleinman, 1990; Gould, Wallenstein, Kleinman, O’Carroll, & Mercy, 1990), and delinquency (Jones, 1997). Common to each of
these examples is the social structure of
transmission. Thus, the fundamental social
causes of disease – primarily social structural
or social interactionist in nature – can be
seen as pathways along which more microlevel causes can exert their effect (Farmer,
1999; Gostin, Burris, & Lazzarini, 1999, p.
74; Lynch et al., 1998; Tolnay & Beck, 1995 ;
Tolnay, Deane, & Beck, 1996; Wilkinson &
Fagan, 1996).
The spread of ideas, behaviors, and practices is contingent on the way in which social
structure brings people together in close
physical proximity within dense social networks (Burt, 1987, p. 1288). For example,
Rowe and Rodgers (1994) show that that
an epidemic model combining social contagion through social contacts among adolescents within a narrow age band explains
the onset and desistance of adolescent sexual behavior (see also Rodgers & Rowe,
1993 ). HIV transmission also has been modeled as a contagious epidemic (May, Anderson, & Blower, 1990). Through a process
of mutual influence involving contact, communication, and competition, adoption of
behaviors occurs when information about
behaviors is transmitted in a way that communicates the substance of an innovation
and the consequences of its adoption. The
consequences can be socially rewarding or
intrinsically pleasurable and may be reinforced through the benefits of a vicarious experience or a trial use. In addition,
these behaviors acquire social meaning that
is communicated through repeated interactions within social networks (Kahan, 1997;
Lessig, 1995 , p. 1947).
Contagious epidemics involve the transmission of an agent via a host through
susceptible organisms whose resilience is
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weakened by other conditions or factors
(Bailey, 1967). Susceptibility is critical to
the ability of an agent to exert its process
on a host. This medical rendering of contagion can be analogized to social contagion
(Jones & Jones, 1994, 1995 ). Thus, the fundamental social causes of disease – primarily social structural, or ecological – can be
seen as pathways along which more microlevel causes can exert their effect (Gostin
et al., 1999, p. 74). According to Gostin and
colleagues (1999), these fundamental social
causes reflect inequalities that work in two
ways. First, these conditions increase exposure to the more proximal causes, whether
microbic or behavioral. Second, they compromise the resistance or resilience of social
groups to these proximal causes. That is,
their exposure and their behavior in those
structural circumstances both have social
roots.
Memetics provides a complementary
framework for understanding how beliefs,
ideas, and behaviors spread throughout society. Memes are singular ideas that evolve
through a process of natural selection not
unlike the evolution of genes in evolutionary biology (Balkin, 1998; Lynch, 1996). The
principal law governing the birth and spread
of memes is that of the “fittest ideas,” defined
as those ideas that are the best at selfreplication rather than those that may be
truest or have the greatest utilitarian value
(Lynch, 1996). In the present analysis, violence may be the “fittest” behavior, even
when it contradicts more socially useful normative values imported from the dominant
society. Memes achieve high-level contagion
through a variety of social interactions across
social units, such as families and social networks, and each mode increases the “host”
population for that meme. The meme is then
reproduced within networks and transmitted across interstitial network boundaries.
Replicated memes become what Balkin
(1998, pp. 42–5 7) refers to as “cultural software” that is expressed in language, behavior,
and normative beliefs, creating a set of normative expectations or behavioral “scripts.”
(Abelson, 1976, 1981; Fagan, 1999). According to Abelson, the script framework is an
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event schema used to organize information
about how people learn to understand and
enact commonplace behavioral patterns. A
“script” is a cognitive structure or framework that organizes a person’s understanding of typical situations, allowing the person
to have expectations and to make conclusions about the potential result of a set of
events. Script theory has been used widely
in social psychology to identify patterns of
decision making and social interactions that
persist among persons within social networks. Script theory can explain contagion
in several ways: (1) Scripts are ways of organizing knowledge and behavioral choices; (2)
individuals learn behavioral repertoires for
different situations; (3 ) these repertoires are
stored in memory as scripts and are elicited
when cues are sensed in the environment;
(4) the choice of scripts varies among individuals, and some individuals will have limited choices; (5 ) individuals are more likely
to repeat scripted behaviors when the previous experience was considered successful;
(6) scripted behavior may become “automatic” without much thought or weighing
of consequences; and (7) scripts are acquired
through social interactions among social network members (Abelson, 1976, 1981).
Accordingly, social contagion is the convergence of transmission of behaviors and
of beliefs that motivate or sustain them.
Social contagion arises from people in proximate social structures using one another
to manage uncertainty of behavior (Burt,
1987; Gostin, 1991; Rodgers & Rowe, 1993 ;
Rowe & Rodgers 1991, 1994). It requires
an interaction in which information, behavioral innovation, belief, or meme is transmitted across a social synapse. At its core,
contagion occurs when two people interact where one has adopted a construct and
the other has not. Contact, communication,
and imitation are influential processes that
make transmission possible (Burt, 1987, pp.
1288–1289). Synapses themselves are situated within social networks, and the adoption of an innovation or a meme triggers
the adoption by another person. Burt (1987)
suggests that adoption has less to do with the
cohesion of people within social structures
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or networks and more to do with the structural equivalence – the social homogeneity –
of the network. That is, transmission is more
likely to occur between similarly situated
persons – siblings, fellow graduate students,
street corner boys – than persons simply
because they are closely bonded (Burt, 1987,
p. 1291).
Within structurally equivalent networks,
similarly situated people are likely to influence or adopt behaviors from one another
that can make that person more attractive
as a source of further relations. The importance of structural equivalence – or placement within a socially homogeneous interpersonal network – is that it fosters interconnected patterns of relationships that make
contagion efficient.
In the remainder of this section, we
show how transmission of violence occurs
across neighborhoods whose social structures of densely packed networks are vulnerable to rapid contagion. Our previous work
on urban youth violence has shown how the
memes of toughness and the valued status
from violence are the object of transmission
and exchange among similarly situated male
youth (Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998a,b; Wilkinson, 2003 ). The implications for a social
influence model of contagion are discussed
in the concluding section.
Guns and Social Contagion
Several processes have contributed to the
epidemic of lethal violence. The growth in
illegal markets heightens the demand for
guns as basic tools that are associated with
routine business activity in illegal markets
(Blumstein, 1995 ; Johnson, Williams, Dei, &
Sanabria, 1990). In turn, the increased presence of weapons and their diffusion into the
general population change normative perceptions of the danger and lethality associated with everyday interpersonal disputes,
giving rise to an “ecology of danger” (Fagan
& Wilkinson, 1998a). Thus, we hypothesize
that guns were initially an exogenous factor
in launching an epidemic of gun homicide,
but became endogenous to socially isolated
neighborhoods and came to dominate social

interactions (Wilkinson and Fagan, 1996).
Everyday disputes, whether personal insults
or retributional violence, in turn are more
likely to be settled with potentially lethal
violence (Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998a; Wilkinson, 2003 ).
Whether viewed in social, medical, or
memetic frameworks, guns can be constructed as a primary agent of violence contagion over the most recent epidemic cycle.
Guns are a form of social toxin (Delgado,
1985 ; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998b) in everyday social interactions, altering the outcome
of disputes and changing the developmental trajectories of young males whose adolescent development took place in the contexts of high rates of gun use and widely
perceived danger, contributing to an ecology of danger that had profound developmental impacts on adolescents growing up
in these settings (Bingenheimer, Brennan, &
Earls, 2005 ; Fagan, 1999).
The development of such an ecology of
danger reflects the confluence and interaction of several sources of contagion. First is
the contagion of fear. Weapons serve as an
environmental cue that in turn may increase
aggressiveness (Slaby & Roedell, 1982). Adolescents presume that their counterparts are
armed and, if not, could easily become
armed. They also assume that other adolescents are willing to use guns, often at a low
threshold of provocation.
The second source is the contagion of
gun behaviors themselves. The use of guns
has instrumental value that is communicated not only through urban “myths” but
also through the incorporation of gun violence into the social discourse of everyday
life among pre-adolescents and adolescents.
Guns are widely available to adolescents
(Cook & Ludwig, 2004), and when carried by adolescents, they are frequently displayed (Harcourt, 2006; Wilkinson, 2003 ).1
They are salient symbols of power and status and strategic means of gaining status,
domination, or material goods (Wilkinson,
2003 ). Wilkinson’s interviews with adolescents and young adults in two New York
City neighborhoods during the mid-1990s
show that guns are used in a myriad of
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different ways and for different purposes;
some uses are seemingly more mild and symbolic than others, but may be the first steps
or building blocks for later more serious use.
For example, very first steps might be simply seeing someone or knowing someone
who has a gun, then looking for a gun in
one’s own house, then maybe trying to get
one, then just flashing one when trying to
threaten/scare an opponent, then using the
gun for pistol whipping, then firing the gun
to scare someone but not aiming to hit them,
then actually firing toward someone, then firing to injure but not kill, and then firing to
kill. The socialization process into the urban
youth gun world begins at a young age, with
influences coming from family and peer networks (Wilkinson, 2003 ; Wilkinson & Fagan,
2001a). How these processes unfold at the
event level is explored in Part IV of this
chapter.
Third is the contagion of violent identities
and the consequent eclipsing or devaluation
of other identities in increasingly socially isolated neighborhoods. These identities reinforce the dominance hierarchy built on
“toughness” and violence, and its salience
devalues other identities. Those unwilling
to adopt at least some dimensions of this
identity are vulnerable to physical attack.
Accordingly, violent identities are not simply affective styles and social choices, but
instead are strategic necessities to navigate through everyday dangers (Wilkinson,
2003 ).2
Finally, when the group nature of youth
violence is examined, diffusion and contagion of attitudes, scripts, and behaviors are
clearly visible. The proximal link between
one violent conflict and the next is startling.
In addition, the social meanings of violent
events reach a broader audience than those
immediately present in a situation. Each
violent event or potentially violent interaction provides a lesson for the participants,
first-hand observers, vicarious observers, and
others influenced by the communication of
stories about the situation that may follow. Expectations, a violent status hierarchy, and norms of interpersonal conduct
among groups of socially isolated young men
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work to hinder nonviolent conflict resolution. Conflict handling among youth who
are affiliated with other youth at least in
part to enhance their personal safety in a
dangerous environment acts to increase the
amount of violence that youth experience,
rather than decrease it. We examine these
issues empirically at the neighborhood level
as well as at the micro-translational level in
New York City.
The Mirco-Processes of Social Contagion:
Social Identity and Violence
Previously, Wilkinson (2003 ) and Fagan and
Wilkinson (1998a) identified several processes operating at the event level that illustrate the spread of violence within social
structures and that exert a contracting influence on social networks of adolescents: (1)
Achieving a highly valued social identity
occurs through extreme displays of violence,
(2) achieving a “safe” social identity may also
require the use of extreme forms of violence,
(3 ) the ready availability of guns clearly
increases the stakes of how one achieves
status, (4) much behavior is motivated by
avoiding being a punk or “herb” (sucker or
weakling), (5 ) identities can change from
being a punk or herb into a more positive status such as “hold your own,” (6)
guns equalize the odds for some smaller
young men through the process of “showing nerve,” (7) one can feel like a punk for
a specific situation but not take on a punk
identity, and (8) one can feel like a “crazy”
killer in a specific situation but not take
on a “crazy” or killer identity. If “compulsive masculinity” or Anderson’s (1994, 1999)
“street orientation” is dominant in public
spaces and personal safety as our data suggest, then those who do not conform will be
victimized.
The maintenance and reinforcement
of identities supportive of violence are
made possible by an effective sociocultural
dynamic that sets forth an age-grading pathway to manhood that includes both behaviors and the means of resolving violations
of respect. Wilkinson (2003 ) described the
strong influence of street code, similar to
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the codes identified by Anderson (1999) or
the code of honor described by Toch (1969),
over the behaviors of young children, adolescents, and young adults. The absence of alternative means of attaining valued masculine
identities further compounds the problem.
The transmission of these social processes
occurs on both the micro and macro levels. Children growing up in this environment
learn these codes, or behavioral-affective systems, by navigating their way through interpersonal situations that often involve violent
encounters.

1960 to 3 1.0 in 1995 . By 1996, the rate had
receded to 13 .9 per 100,000, a level unseen
since 1968. Figure 3 6.1 shows the gun and
nongun homicide rates for 1968–2000.
From 1900 through the beginning of the
run-up in homicide in the mid-1960s, and
with one exceptional era following the passage of the Volstead Act in 1919, homicide rates in New York City varied narrowly
between 3 .8 and 5 .8 per 100,000 population
(Monkonnen, 2001).3 From 1965 to 1970,
the average annual homicide rate rose from
7.6 to 12.6 and rose again to 21.7 by 1975 .
Thus, homicide in New York nearly tripled
within a decade. The rates remained elevated
above the 1968 rates until 1998. Accordingly, Figure 3 6.1 suggests that, for three
decades, homicides in New York were normalized at an elevated rate and were for a
long time characteristic of the city’s social
landscape. Thus, the escalation in killings
until the 1990s was cumulative, with each
new peak building on the elevation of the
base rate established in the previous peak.
One interpretation of the recent decline may
simply be the recession of this longer-term
social and historical trend.

The Epidemiology of Youth Homicide
in New York City
Historical and Current Homicide Trends
The epidemic of youth violence in New
York City since the mid-1980s is best understood in a social and historical context that
spans nearly 3 5 years. Like the nation’s
largest cities, New York experienced a sharp
increase in homicide and other violence rates
beginning in the mid-1960s. The homicide
rate rose from 4.7 per 100,000 population in
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Figure 36.1. Gun and nongun homicide rates per 100,000 persons, 1968–2000, New York City.
Source: Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, various years.
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Figure 3 6.1 also shows that this longterm trend involves three sub-epidemics.
The first of these peaked in 1972, the second
in 1981, and the third in 1991. Each coincided
temporally with drug epidemics and the
growth of retail drug markets: heroin in the
early 1970s (Agar & Reisinger, 2002; Egan
& Robinson, 1979; Hunt & Chambers, 1976;
Inciardi, 1979), the emergence of urban
street drug markets in the late 1970s where
powdered cocaine was openly sold (Johnson et al., 1990; Johnston, 1987; Williams,
1989; Zimmer, 1987, 1990), and crack beginning in 1985 (Johnson et al., 1990). The successive epidemics were cumulative in their
trends, not distinct. To re-introduce an idea
from Part I, the pattern of killings in particular resembles a roller coaster, with an ascent
through the late 1970s to a relatively low
peak, a return to near the previous low point,
and a sharp increase to a high peak in 1990
followed by a sharp drop.
Figure 3 6.1 shows the growing importance of guns in homicides in each of
the three peaks. Increases in both gun
and nongun homicides contributed to the
tripling of homicide rates through 1972. In
1972, the ratio of gun to nongun homicides was 1.23 . By the next peak in 1981,
the 1,187 gun deaths were nearly 1.76 times
greater than the 673 nongun homicides.
In 1991, the modern peak, the 1,644 gun
homicides were 3 .16 times greater than
the 5 19 nongun homicides. In addition to
sharp increases in the number of gun homicides, the gun:nongun ratio also rose sharply
because of a long-term decline in the number of nongun homicides. Since 1980, the
number and rate of nongun homicides have
declined by nearly 5 0%, from 73 5 to 3 3 5
nongun killings in 1996. There are thus two
dynamic and different patterns in the data
on homicide by weapon. Gun killings follow
the roller-coaster pattern of steadily increasing peaks beginning in 1972. Nongun killings
trend down from 1980 to rates unseen since
1960. This long-term secular trend in nongun
killings is substantial, but it has not previously been noticed.
Figure 3 6.1 also shows that the recent
cycle beginning in 1985 was qualitatively
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different from the preceding peaks in five
important ways: (1) Its starting point was
lower than the starting point for the previous (1981) peak, (2) its peak was about
15 % higher than the preceding peak, (3 ) it
had a far greater share of gun killings, (4)
its decline was far steeper than any previous
decline, and (5 ) homicides have remained at
their low point far longer than in any of the
previous three epidemics.
To illustrate the extent of the differences
between the 1985 –2000 cycle and its predecessors, Figure 3 6.2 presents the data from
Figure 3 6.1 normed to the 1985 base.4 Gun
killings accounted for all of the increase
in homicides since 1985 and most of the
decline. Although the declines after 1992 in
nongun killings are a continuation of the
8 years of previous decreases, the increase
and decline in gun killings are evidence of a
homicide spike that is unique from its predecessors. Nongun killings declined steadily
since 1986 and by 1996 were about half the
1985 rate, suggesting a secular decline in
nongun homicide that may be independent
of the gun homicide epidemic.
The epidemic pattern was well observed
through homicide data, but public health
data on nonlethal violence in part tell the
same story. Data from the City’s Injury
Surveillance System provide information
on hospitalizations for intentional injuries
(NYC Department of Health and Mental
Hygience, 1997, and various years). Figure
3 6.3 shows that the decline in homicides was
accompanied by a general decline in nonfatal
assaults. These data were available for analysis beginning in 1990, about the same time
that the homicide epidemic reached its peak.
Figure 3 6.3 shows that, beginning in 1990,
nearly all the decline in nonfatal assaults
were declines in gun assaults; assaults by
other means, such as blunt instruments or
cutting instruments (e.g., knives), declined
at a much lower rate. So, the rise and fall in
homicides did not necessarily reflect changes
either in the lethality of gun violence or a
change in the case-fatality rate. Rather, gun
violence declined generally over time following increases that also were almost exclusively the result of gun violence.
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Figure 36.2 . Gun and nongun homicide rates, 1968–2002, indexed to 1985 rates, New York City.
Source: Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, various years.

The importance of the most recent era of
homicide rise and decline, not only in its epidemiological pattern but also in its influence
on law and policy (Feld, 1999; Stuntz, 2001;
Zimring, 1999), leads us to focus the analysis in the next part and also in the section

titled “The Epidemiology of Youth Homicide in New York City” on the patterns of
homicide and violence in this era, and especially on the period from 1985 –1996, when
the rise and fall in homicide were the most
dramatic and acute.
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Figure 36.3. Gun and nongun homicide and assault by firearm, 1985 –2000. Source: Office of Vital
Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, various years;
Injury Prevention Bureau, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, various years.
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The Social Structure of Homicide
The demographic patterns of gun and
nongun homicide victimization during this
period tell a series of interesting stories,
some predictable and others surprising.
First, the homicide trends for women differ
from the patterns for men. Any benefits of
the end of the violence epidemic accrued to
men; women’s risk of violent victimization
remained stable at a level far lower than
that of men. Second, changes in adolescent
homicide rates were accompanied by parallel but less dramatic changes among older
populations. This trend varies from the
national picture of steadily declining rates
among older groups. Third, as we saw earlier, the homicide run-up and decline were
concentrated in gun killings. Fourth, the
homicide epidemic was concentrated among
non-Whites. We observed these trends for
both homicide victims and offenders, which
are discussed below. The data are available
at: http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/
researchdata/contagion.

gender
Nearly all the increase and decline in killings
from 1985 –1995 were gun homicides of
males. The rate of gun killings among males
doubled from 21.8 per 100,000 in 1985
to 44.5 in 1991. Nongun killings of males
declined steadily throughout this period
and by 1995 were less than half the 1985
rate. Killings of males were increasingly gun
events: the ratio of gun to nongun homicide
victimizations of males increased from about
1.5 :1 in 1985 to 3 .23 :1 in 1995 .
The temporal patterns were similar for
females. The rate of gun homicides of
females peaked in 1991, the same year
as males, and sustained their peak rate
for approximately 3 years before dropping
sharply in 1994. By 1995 , gun homicides
for females had dropped 5 % below their
1985 levels. Nongun homicides of women
declined steadily throughout this period,
from 4.7 per 100,000 in 1985 to 3 .8 per
100,000 in 1995 . But unlike males, the rates
of nongun homicides of females were higher
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than the rates of gun homicides. Throughout the period, the changes in rates for
females were quite small, and not far from
the expected rates historically. The same is
true of male nongun killings. Accordingly,
this epidemic is confined to gun killings
among males.

age
Much of public and scholarly attention on
violence in the past decade has focused on
the increase in gun homicides by adolescents (Blumstein, 1995 ; Cook & Laub, 1998).
Trends nationwide show that gun homicide
rates for adolescents increased during this
period while gun homicide rates for persons
over 25 years of age were declining. In New
York City, homicides were not confined to
younger age groups, but were a serious problem across a wide age range from 15 to 3 4
years of age. Table 3 6.1 shows that gun homicide rates were higher than nongun rates for
all age groups. For each year, gun homicide
rates were highest for persons aged 20 to 24
in all years. Gun homicides by adolescents
aged 15 to 19 rose more sharply over this
period than other older population groups.
Nevertheless, although adolescent participation in gun homicide rose sharply from 1985 –
1991, rates for other age groups also continued to rise during this period.
Gun homicide rates declined sharply for
all three age groups from 1992–1995 , to
about 5 0% of their peak rates in 1991, and
were about the same as their 1985 rates.
Although the post-1991 decline was precipitous for adolescents aged 15 to 19, their
1995 gun homicide rates remained 25 %
above their 1985 base rate. Table 3 6.1 also
shows that nongun homicide rates declined
steadily for all age groups and by 1995 were
5 0% or more lower than their 1985 rates
(NYC Department of Health and Mental
Hygience, 1997). Similar to gun homicide
rates, the nongun homicide rates were highest for persons aged 20 to 24.

race
Nationally, virtually all increases in homicide
rates from 1985 to 1990 among people 10 to
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Table 36.1: Adolescent gun and nongun
homicide rates by age, New York City,
1985–1995
Year

1:3

<15

Gun Homicides
1985
0.6
1986
1.1
1987
1.2
1988
1.5
1989
1.3
1990
2.2
1991
1.0
1992
1.3
1993
1.6
1994
0.7
1995
0.8

15 –19

2 0–2 4 2 5 –3 4

Table 36.2 : Gun and nongun homicide
rates per 100,000 persons by race,
1985–1995

≥3 5

Gun
Year

20.8
19.9
3 3 .1
45 .5
43 .1
5 0.9
5 7.4
48.3
48.5
3 9.6
26.0

3 4.1
44.1
5 0.6
5 6.8
60.0
66.3
66.3
68.1
63 .8
47.5
3 4.7

21.1
25 .6
25 .3
3 3 .5
3 7.9
42.2
42.2
42.8
3 7.5
3 0.0
18.1

7.1
6.9
8.5
9.2
9.0
10.8
12.6
11.0
11.7
8.3
6.9

Nongun Homicides
1985
2.9
10.4
1986
3 .4
8.0
1987
1.8
6.3
1988
3 .0
6.1
1989
2.6
6.5
1990
3 .4
12.8
1991
3 .1
8.0
1992
2.4
6.9
1993
4.1
3 .9
1994
3 .1
6.1
1995
2.6
5 .2

15 .7
17.7
14.1
14.6
12.3
15 .5
11.1
8.6
7.0
7.0
6.8

12.2
14.1
12.7
12.3
13 .4
14.7
10.9
7.9
8.9
8.8
6.6

9.4
8.4
7.8
7.9
7.0
7.4
6.5
6.2
6.5
5 .7
5 .1

3 4 years of age were due to deaths of African
American males. Most of these were firearm
fatalities that were overwhelmingly concentrated demographically and spatially among
African American males in urban areas
(Fingerhut, Ingram, & Feldman, 1992a,b.)
Table 3 6.2 shows that the trends in New
York mirror these national trends. Unfortunately, none of the data sources permitted detailed disaggregation of the homicide
trends by ethnicity over the entire 1985 –
1995 period. Detailed data were available
only for African Americans; Whites and Hispanics were not distinguished in the police
or Vital Statistics data until after 1990.
Therefore, our analysis is limited to comparisons between whites and non-Whites;
non-Whites are primarily persons of African
descent, including some Hispanics.
The within-race ratio of gun to nongun
homicide rates for each year in the 1985 –

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Nongun

White Non-White White Non-White
10.1
10.9
9.8
13 .2
15 .1
18.8
19.4
19.3
17.2
12.8
9.5

12.8
15 .2
20.7
23 .6
23 .2
25 .1
26.6
24.3
24.5
18.9
12.8

8.0
7.3
6.1
6.4
6.7
8.9
6.4
6.0
5 .5
5 .7
4.5

10.6
11.3
10.1
10.1
8.9
9.0
7.8
6.0
7.2
5 .8
5 .5

1995 period illustrates the concentration of
the homicide epidemic in gun homicides
among non-Whites. For Whites, the ratio
rises from 1.26:1 in 1985 to a peak of 3 .23 :1
in 1992, before receding to 2.1:1 in 1995 .
For non-Whites, the ratio rises from 1.20:1
in 1985 to a peak of 4.05 :1 in 1992 and
recedes to 2.3 2:1 in 1995 . However, the narrow difference between Whites and nonWhites may reflect the inclusion of Hispanics among the Whites in the population and
homicide counts. The extent of this bias can
be seen in 1993 data from the New York
City Department of Health injury surveillance system. The mortality and morbidity
rates of gunshot wounds for Hispanics are
228 per 100,000 persons, compared to 3 02
for African Americans and 60 for Whites
in that period (NYC Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, 1992; New York State
Department of Health, 1994).

victim-offender homogeneity
Most homicides are within-group events,
especially with respect to gender, race, and
ethnicity (Cook & Laub, 1998; Sampson &
Lauritsen, 1994).5 We analyzed data from
police reports on the within-age distribution of homicide events for each year in
the recent homicide cycle to estimate the
proportion of homicides in which victims
and offenders both came from their own
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age group. From 1985 –1995 , we observed
within-group homogeneity with respect to
our limited categories of race, a trend evident also in national data (Cook & Laub,
1998). Age homogeneity was more varied
and depended on the method of homicide.
Age homogeneity for gun homicides was
highest for homicide offenders aged 25 to 3 4
and lowest for 20- to 24- year-olds. The low
rates for the group aged 20 to 24 reflects their
age status between the two other groups and
the higher likelihood of cross-age interactions.
Age differences widened during the
homicide cycle beginning in 1985 . At the
outset of the homicide run-up in 1985 , age
homogeneity for gun and nongun homicides
was low: about one gun homicide in four
involved persons within the same age categories. For adults aged 25 to 3 4, about 4 in
10 gun homicides were within-age killings. A
year later, both age homogeneity and homicide rates increased. Within-age gun homicides for young adults aged 20 to 24 rose
from 22.9% of gun homicides in 1985 to
3 5 .8% in 1990; for offenders aged 25 to 3 4
years, within-age group homicides rose from
3 8.5 % in 1985 to 5 4.9% in 1989. Even with
these increases, however, the majority of gun
killings involved persons from different age
groups. During the same period, within-age
nongun homicide rates varied from year to
year in an inconsistent pattern.
The results are not surprising: age stratification of peer groups has traditionally created age-specific social networks. Age grading is a hallmark of street gangs (Klein,
1995 ) and adolescent cliques (Schwendinger
& Schwendinger, 1985 ). These rigid age
boundaries offered few opportunities for
cross-age social interactions among delinquent groups. But contextual changes in
street corner life in inner cities, where homicides were concentrated throughout this
period, contributed to a breakdown of traditional age grading. The emergence of street
drug markets and dense street corner groups
of males not in the workforce contributed
to a mixing of the ages on the street. Among
adolescents and young adults, competition
for street status through violence contributes
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to a process of “status forcing” that promotes
cross-age interactions (Wilkinson, 2003 ).

contextual effects
Both popular and social science explanations of the homicide epidemic in New
York and elsewhere have focused on social
trends, particularly changes in drug markets
(Baumer, 1994; Baumer et al., 1998; Blumstein, 1995 ; Cork, 1999; Grogger & Willis,
2000). Fagan et al. (1998) discuss the appeal
of these explanations. First, homicide and
drug epidemics have been closely phased,
both temporally and spatially, in New York
and nationwide, for nearly 3 0 years (Fagan,
1990; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1997). Homicide peaks in 1972, 1979, and 1991 mirror three drug epidemics: heroin, cocaine
hydrochloride (powder), and crack cocaine.
These long-term trends predict that trends
in drug use would occur contemporaneously with trends in homicide. Second, the
emergence of volatile crack markets in 1985
is cited as one of the primary contextual
factors that have driven up homicide rates
in New York (Bourgois, 1995 ; Goldstein,
Brownstein, Ryan, & Bellucci, 1989; Johnson et al., 1990). Competition between sellers, conflicts between buyers and sellers, and
intraorganizational conflict were all contributors to lethal violence within crack markets
(Fagan & Chin, 1989, 1991; Hamid, 1990).
Crack also is implicated in the decline of
homicide since 1991 (Curtis, 1998).
Figure 3 6.4 compares trends in gun homicides for three age groups with trends in
drug overdose deaths. Drug overdose deaths
follow a pattern of short cycles, with relatively brief periods of increase and decline.
The rates increase from 1986 to 1988, decline
through 1990, and increase again for 3
years before leveling off. The run-up of gun
homicide rates in 1985 to 1988 matches an
increase in drug overdose deaths, but homicides continued to increase even as drug
overdose deaths declined. Drug overdose
death rates increase from 1992 to 1994, even
as gun homicide rates decline. Accordingly,
there appears to be little mutual influence
of drug overdose deaths and gun homicide
trends for any of the three age groups.6
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Figure 36.4. Drug overdose death and age-specific gun homicide victimization rate, 1985 –1995 .
Source: Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, various years.

Changes in drug use patterns may explain
this disjuncture, with drugs such as heroin
returning as the favored street drug and
displacing crack and crack markets (Curtis,
1998). These drugs are more likely to cause
overdose deaths.
An alternative indicator of drug market
activity is drug arrests. The size, location,
and intensity of drug markets can be approximated by drug arrest rates (Cork, 1999;
Rosenfeld & Decker, 1999). Accordingly,
drug arrests reflect both strategic decisions
by police and drug market characteristics.
In conjunction with other indicators, arrests
are a useful marker of drug trends. However,
the trend lines in Figure 3 6.5 for age-specific
homicide victimization rates and felony drug
arrest rates show little relationship between
gun homicides and drug arrests. Both drug
arrests and gun homicide rates increase from
1986 through 1989, but the trend lines move
in different directions after that. Homicides
increase through 1991 for adolescents and
1992 for young adults. Drug arrests decline
from 1990 through 1993 and begin to rise
again in 1994. Most of these felony drug
arrests were for sale or possession with intent
to sell, and most were either crack or cocaine

arrests, the two drugs that were traded most
actively in street markets. The portion of
felony drug arrests that involved crack or
cocaine rose from 5 7% in 1986 to 64%
in 1988 and declined steadily to 48% in
1995 .
These figures show that neither drug selling activity nor increases in problematic drug
consumption adequately explain the runup and decline in gun homicides. Violence
associated with drug use remained relatively
infrequent during the onset of the crack crisis (Fagan, 1992; Fagan & Chin, 1989, 1991).
Moreover, the share of homicides due to
drug selling did not rise during the homicide run-up (Goldstein et al., 1989). Drug
selling accounts for an unknown proportion of homicides, with estimates ranging
from about 10% nationwide in the FBI’s
Supplemental Homicide Reports (FBI, various years) to 5 0% in local studies in New
York (Goldstein et al., 1989) or Los Angeles (Klein, Maxson, & Cunningham, 1991).
Thus, a decline in street-level drug selling activity may have reduced, to some
unknown extent, the types of social interactions that lead to gun killings. But drug
selling alone is unlikely to have produced
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Figure 36.5. Age-specific felony drug arrest rates and gun homicide victimization rates, 1985 –1995 .
Source: Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, various years; New York City Police Department, various years.

the unprecedented run-up or decline in gun
killings so consistently across time, social
groups, and areas.
Finally, demographic changes also offer
limited explanations for either the homicide
increase or decline. The population for the
highest risk groups, non-White males aged
15 to 29, declined by about 10% from 1985 –
1995 (Fagan et al., 1998), a far smaller scale
of change than the change that could produce the observed declines in gun homicides.
Although it is tempting to dismiss demography as a correlate of the homicide decline,
the relationship of population to a changing
behavioral pattern may be nonlinear (Gladwell, 2000). In other words, did the population decline reach a threshold where it could
lead to a decline in the incidence of gun
homicides? According to Burt (1987), network density promotes social contagion by
increasing exponentially the extent of contact between persons within groups is nonlinear. Perhaps population density among
the highest risk groups rose during the runup in violence and reached a threshold or
tipping point at which behavioral change
accelerated and spread through a population before beginning its process of decline

(see, for example, Crane, 1991; Gladwell,
2000). As the population declined, so too
did the rate of contacts. This is a plausible but unlikely explanation. First, the age
decline was small: less than 10% in the highest risk groups. Second, the breakdown in
age grading of violence during this period
may have mitigated cohort effects and diffused behaviors broadly across age groups.
Like the effects of declining drug markets,
the contraction in the highest risk population is a potentially important influence in
the decline in firearm homicides from 1992–
1996, one that may contain the mechanisms
of decline. We turn to these mechanisms in
the next sections.

Neighborhood Effects on Social
Contagion of Youth Homicide
We begin with a set of analyses that estimate the probabilities of the diffusion of
behaviors across social areas or neighborhoods. We use census tract as the boundary
for “neighborhood,” based on the size (area)
of tracts in New York and their isomorphism with important social units, such as
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public housing developments and feeder
school patterns. Tracts are commonly used
to represent neighborhoods in sociological
research because of their size and robustness in predicting variation in a variety of
social interactions (see, for example, Land,
McCall, & Cohen, 1990). Other studies have
estimated diffusion across similarly small
areas comprised of a few tracts that represent neighborhoods with meaningful social
boundaries (e.g., Crane, 1991; Fagan, West, &
Holland, 2003 ; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). These analyses set the stage
for the analysis in Part V of micro-social
interactions in which social interactions animate dynamics of social contagion that diffuse violence across groups and places.
A. Susceptibility: Neighborhood Risk
We draw on the literature of neighborhoods
and violence to construct a framework of
structural risk that simultaneously compromises resilience against transmission while
increasing susceptibility. Both theory and
empirical research suggest that neighborhoods are susceptible to the spread of violence when structurally weakened (Massey,
1995 ; Patterson, 1991; Roncek & Maier, 1991;
Rose & McClain, 1990; Taylor & Covington,
1988). For example, recent studies suggest
that violence shares several explanatory
variables with concentrated poverty (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994; Wilson, 1987, 1991),
resource deprivation (Land et al., 1990;
Williams & Flewelling, 1988), and inequality (Messner & Tardiff, 1986; Morenoff &
Tienda, 1997; Sampson, 1987; Shihadeh &
Steffensmeier, 1994). These constructs
describe the lack of sufficient means,
including income poverty and inequality, to
sustain informal social control (Sampson,
1993 ; Sampson & Wilson, 1995 ).
Wilson (1987) argues that there has been
both an economic and a social transformation of the inner city, in which the exodus of
manufacturing jobs beginning in the 1970’s
has changed the social and economic composition of inner cities, leading to a concentration of resource deprivation. He suggests
that the concentration of resource depriva-

tion in specific areas led to dynamic changes
in the processes of socialization and social
control in those areas. As middle- and working class African American families moved
away from the inner cities when their jobs
left, there remained behind a disproportionate concentration of the most disadvantaged
segments of the urban populations: poor
female-headed households with children
and chronically unemployed males with low
job skills. The secondary effects of this exodus created conditions that were conducive
to rising teenage violence: the weakness of
mediating social institutions (e.g., churches,
schools), and the absence of informal social
controls to supervise and mentor youths.7
Wilson (1987) refers to these conditions of
weak social control as social isolation.
The concept of social isolation suggests
an ecological dynamic in which the components of poverty and structural disadvantage are interconnected with the dynamics
of social control and opportunity structures.
The decline of manufacturing jobs increased
unemployment among adult males, primarily African Americans, whose lack of technical skills and deep human capital limited
them to low-wage and short-term unskilled
labor positions. Other economic transformations, including the rise of service and
technical jobs outside central cities, motivated the exodus of middle-class families
to the outer rings and suburbs surrounding
the inner cities. Remaining within the abandoned central cities were unskilled males
whose “marriage capital” was low, giving rise
to an increasing divorce rate and declining
marriage rate.
Changes in the composition of central
city neighborhoods also weakened the social
institutions that were critical to the informal social control and collective supervision
of youths. The weakening of social controls
had their strongest effects in transactional
settings of neighborhoods and in places like
schools and church where adolescent development takes place. And, the exodus of
middle-class families from inner cities weakened the political strength of the remaining families, leading to physical deterioration
(Wallace, 1991), lower housing values, and in
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turn increased residential (spatial) segregation (Massey & Denton, 1993 ).
In turn, the social isolation of people
and families was extended to institutions
(Wacquant & Wilson, 1989). The rise in
poverty and weakening of social institutions
also undermined the presence of and institutional support for conventional behaviors.
As a result, conventional values and behaviors were attenuated because they were not
salient and had little payoff for one’s survival or status (Elliott et al., 1996; Tienda,
1991; Wilson, 1987). These dynamics in turn
attenuated neighborhood social organization, increasing the likelihood that illegitimate opportunity structures would emerge:
illegal economies including drug distribution or extortion, gangs (Fagan, 1989, 1993 ;
Brotherton et al., 2004), and social networks to support them. These structures
competed with declining legal work opportunities both as income sources and as
sources for social status. As these networks
flourished, the systems of peer and deviant
social control replaced the controls of social
institutions and conventional peer networks
(Fagan, 1992, 1993 ).
Accordingly, violence and homicide are
more likely to occur in an ecological context of weak social control, poorly supervised adolescent networks, widespread perceptions of danger and the demand for lethal
weapons, and the attenuation of outlets to
resolve disputes without violence. It is in
this ecology of danger that violence becomes
transmittable through weapons and their
impact on perception and decision making
in social interactions.
Analytic Models: Diffusion
and Contagion
We estimated models of contagion of gun
violence (homicide and assault) and its
diffusion across New York City neighborhoods from 1985 –2000. Although the
sharpest changes in violence rates occurred
from 1991–1995 , we took advantage of data
through 2000 to chart the continuing pattern of decline over the succeeding 5 years.
We tested two distinct conceptual models
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for the spread of gun violence from one
neighborhood to the next. An outward contagion model posits that adolescent violence
spreads out from a central census tract (T)
or the immediate neighborhood to adjacent
census tracts (X, Y, and Z) or the surrounding community. In this model, the incidence
and prevalence of adolescent homicide or
assault violence in a given neighborhood
exert a significant influence over the incidence and prevalence of adolescent violence
rates in the adjacent community.
This influence is hypothesized to operate
in at least two different ways. First, a threshold effect is expected concerning adolescent
homicide counts, such that the presence of
at least one adolescent homicide in a given
neighborhood will substantially increase the
probability of experiencing at least one adolescent homicide in the surrounding community. Second, with respect to adolescent
homicide rates more precisely, positive covariation is anticipated whereby increases or
decreases in the adolescent homicide rate
of violence in a neighborhood are reflected
in concomitant increases or decreases in the
surrounding community’s adolescent homicide violence rate.
It is also possible that the contagion effect
of adolescent violence is reversed. Accordingly, the inward contagion model asserts
that the level of adolescent violence in an
immediate neighborhood is at least partially
contingent on the level of adolescent violence in its broader community. Again, the
two distinct relationship forms (threshold
effect and positive co-variation) are possible. By considering the simultaneous influence of adjacent spaces, we address the problem of spatial autocorrelation by effectively
controlling for mutual influences within and
over time.
In addition to corresponding adolescent
violence rates, both the outward and inward
contagion models incorporate relevant structural and demographic features of neighborhoods and communities as key explanatory
constructs. Thus, for the full outward contagion model, the presence and rate of the
adolescent homicide rate or assault rate in
the surrounding community are a function
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of the relevant characteristics of the community, as well as the presence or rate of adolescent homicide violence in the neighborhood.
In contrast, the full inward contagion model
suggests that both relevant neighborhood
features and the presence or rate of adolescent homicide in the community predict the
presence or rate of adolescent violence in the
neighborhood. Although these factors are
presumed to play a significant, independent
role in the prediction of adolescent violence
rates, it is nonetheless hypothesized that
effects of homicide violence rates as independent variables will remain substantial,
even once controls for relevant neighborhood and community characteristics have
been introduced.
Models were estimated using mixed
effects regression models. Mixed effects
regression models approximate multilevel
models in which data are hierarchically organized. For example, this class of models is
useful in such cases as estimating the simultaneous effects of school climate and individual student family background on standardized test scores, or neighborhood characteristics and household composition on crime
rates (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Singer
& Willett, 2003 ; Snijders & Bosker, 1994).
Mixed effects models also are useful in estimating individual growth curves or withinsubject change over time. In these examples,
we might specify the ecological effects of
school or neighborhood as fixed effects and
individual household or family influences as
random effects. This specification approximates the presumed hierarchy of influences. One may reverse the specification as
well, comparing estimates to assess reciprocal effects between the two sets of predictors. Mixed effects models simulate the hierarchy of effects by estimating the differences
in error-co-variance matrix structures for
each set of effects (Singer & Willett, 2003 ).8
In this analysis, the contagion models
are specified using both fixed and random
effects. The fixed effects of the neighborhood (outward model) and adjacent community (inward model) structural characteristics and violence rates are interpreted
as standard regression coefficients. But the

analytic strategy also assumes that neighborhoods and communities have varying mean
violence levels and that they exhibit distinct trajectories of violence over time. We
account for the variance in average levels
of violence by specifying random intercepts
in our models. To estimate changes over
time, we use a repeated measures design in
which year is included as a random effect
that approximates a developmental growth
curve (Goldstein, 2003 ). We also estimate
an autoregressive co-variance structure to
account for the strong correlations of homicide and violence rates through time in census tracts and their surrounding neighborhoods.
We use the Poisson form of the model
to estimate counts of both gun and nongun
homicides and assaults. Poisson techniques
are appropriate to identify factors that
predict the number of occurrences of an
event within a specific observation period
(Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1995 ; Land,
McCall, & Nagin, 1996). Such “count” models are appropriate, given the relatively low
number of homicides in most tracts in most
years and the sharp right-hand skew in the
distribution of both homicides and assaults.
To estimate the adolescent component of
the total violence rate, including both homicides and assaults, we included co-variates
that estimate the age composition of neighborhoods including the ratio of youths aged
15 –24 to persons over age 5 0 in each tract.
Because homicide and assault victimization
during this period was disproportionately
due to gun violence and also concentrated
among African Americans, we estimate separate models for total homicide or assault,
gun homicide or violence, and gun victimization for African Americans.
Data

dependent variables
The dependent variables include counts of
homicides, gun homicides, injury assaults
that lead to hospitalization, and gun injury
assaults. We also estimate specific counts of
these variables for African American victims. These data were obtained from the
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Table 36.3: Means and standard deviations for census tracts, New York City, 1990
Variable
% Households with Public Assistance Income
Gini for Total Household Income
% Households Under Poverty Level
% High-School Graduates – Total – 25 +
% Employed in Managerial, Professional, or
Technical Jobs
Employment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate
% Non-White
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Female Headed Households with Children <18
Supervision Ratio (25 –64 by 5 –24)
%Youth Population (5 –15 )
Residential Mobility – Same House as 1985
Population – 1990
Foreign Born
Linguistic Isolation
Vacancy Rate
%Occupied Units That Are Rentals
Density – Mean Persons Per Occupied Room

N

Mean

Standard Deviation

215 7
215 7
215 7
2174
2162

13 .81
0.3 7
18.10
66.3 3
29.69

13 .28
0.09
15 .06
16.3 4
15 .17

2164
2175
2175
2175
215 7
2162
2175
2175
2216
2175
2175
2160
215 7
215 7

90.27
60.64
5 4.86
0.3 8
10.09
2.42
14.69
62.93
3 3 04.41
27.3 2
10.95
5 .5 3
65 .10
0.67

7.08
11.5 5
3 6.17
0.19
10.43
2.08
6.74
11.84
2465 .07
15 .13
10.13
5 .93
25 .89
0.61

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary File STF 3 AFile.

Injury Surveillance System of the New York
City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene. The Injury Surveillance System
collates information from the New York City
Department of Health (DOH) to form a
database of injury and fatality locations for
cases involving violence victims. All weapon
assault injuries, fatal and nonfatal, are generated through this archive. The data come
from two public health data sources: Vital
Statistics (mortality records) and the New
York State hospital admissions database,
SPARCS, for hospitalized assault injuries.
The latter data were compiled from the
hospital patient discharge summaries, with
ICD-9 E-Codes (injury codes) for the supplementary classification of external causes
of injury. The data are hierarchically organized to avoid duplications for persons who
were initially hospitalized but then died.9
Unfortunately, nonlethal injury data were
unavailable until 1990, and so the time series
begins at the point when the trends already
had begun their decline.

independent variables
Independent variables operationalize the
model of neighborhood risk or susceptibility described earlier. Data reflecting the
structural and demographic composition of
neighborhoods and communities are predictors in the contagion models. Following
Land et al. (1990), we selected 19 tractlevel variables from the 1990 Census (STF3 A
and 3 B files) to characterize social areas.
Means and variances for the 19 initial variables are presented in Table 3 6.3 . Principal
components analysis was used to eliminate
autocorrelation among the 14 variables and
identify 3 orthogonal and conceptually distinct factors. Table 3 6.4 shows that neighborhoods and communities are characterized
along three dimensions: deprivation, population characteristics, and social control.
Because communities are actually composites of census tracts, their factor scores are
actually weighted factor score composites.
Estimates were weighted by the 1990 tract
population.
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Table 36.4: Factor composition, New York City census tracts, 1990

Factor

Rotated Factor
Score

Poverty/Inequality
% Households Under Poverty Level
% Households with Public Assistance Income
Gini for Total Household Income

0.96
0.93
0.87

Labor Market/Human Capital
% High-School Graduates – Total – 25 +
% Managerial, Professional, or Technical Jobs
Employment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate

0.91
0.84
0.74
0.72

Segregation
Racial Fragmentation Index
% Non-White

0.81
0.81

Social Control #1 – Supervision
%Youth Population (5 –15 )
% Female Headed Households w/Children <18
Supervision Ratio (25 –64 by 5 –24)
Social Control #2 – Anonymity
Population – 1990
Residential Mobility – Same House as 1985

2.5 4

84.73

2.60

65 .03

1.3 1

65 .27

1.97

65 .5 6

1.02

5 0.78

1.5 2

76.25

1.24

41.48

0.71
0.71
0.87
0.87

Housing Structure
%Occupied Units That Are Rentals
Density – Persons Per Occupied Room
Vacancy Rate

0.76
0.5 5
0.60

The “contagion effect” of adolescent homicide is not expected to be immediate. Similar to the concept of incubation, it is more
reasonable to assume that some period of
time must elapse between the occurrence of
an adolescent homicide (threshold effect) or
change in the adolescent homicide rate (positive co-variation) and the realization of a
related occurrence or rate change. For this
study, the time elapsed is estimated to be
1 year. For example, with the outward contagion model, the adolescent homicide rate
in a neighborhood for 1990 is used to predict the rate in the surrounding community
for 1991. Conversely, the adolescent rate for
a neighborhood in 1993 under the inward
contagion model is estimated using the com-

% Variance
Explained

0.92
0.80
−0.70

Immigration
Linguistic Isolation
Foreign Born

contagion effects

Eigenvalue

munity adolescent homicide rate from 1992.
However, models with 2-year time lags produced results very similar to those reported
here. Thus the results as reported do not
appear to be an artifact of the lag time
chosen.
Results
On a preliminary note, we remind readers that the critical parameter in this
class of models is the interaction of the
time by contagion measures. The parameter estimate for the interaction indicates
whether the rate of change in the parameter is a significant predictor of the rate of
change of the dependent variable. The main
effects can be interpreted as explanations for
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differences in the average rates over the
entire duration of the panel. The results in
Tables 3 6.5 and 3 6.6 show parameter estimates for the factors of interest in the contagion story, including spatial autocorrelation. All models are controlled statistically
for the neighborhood susceptibility factors
discussed earlier. We use a quadratic form of
the time parameter to reflect the nonlinear
distribution of the homicide and injury rates
over time.
There is evidence of both inward and
outward contagion for homicide and injury
assault, but the patterns vary by type of violence, means of violence, and race of the victims. For total homicide, including gun and
nongun homicides, Table 3 6.5 Panel A shows
results of three outward contagion models. Neither total homicides nor gun homicides are statistically significant. The parameter estimate for the interaction of time by
homicide in the surrounding tracts is significant only in the model for gun homicide victimization of African Americans, and
the direction is negative. The interpretation
for the coefficient is somewhat counterintuitive – it does not imply that there are
fewer homicides in the surrounding tracts
over time. Instead, as the overall homicide
trend declines, a negative coefficient suggests
that this factor is opposing that trend in the
dependent variable. In this case, then, the
negative coefficient for the time by homicide interaction indicates that the rate of
homicide victimization of African Americans in the surrounding neighborhoods is
increasing, controlling for the rates in the
surrounded neighborhood in the previous
year. The exponentiated coefficient is .989,
suggesting that an increase of one homicide
in a neighborhood in T0 predicts an increase
of 1.1% in the number of homicides in any of
the surrounding areas.
Panel B in Table 3 6.5 presents consistent evidence of homicide contagion. The
estimates for time by contagion are significant and negative in all three models. The
exponentiated coefficient for total homicide
is .992, suggesting that an increase of one
homicide in the surrounding tracts in T0 predicts an increase of 0.8% in the number of

1:3

707

homicides in the surrounded tracts in T1 .
For the other models in Panel B, the effects
also are significant and are larger: an increase
of 1.0% for gun homicides for an increment
of one homicide in the surrounding tracts,
and 2.0 for gun homicide victimizations of
African Americans.
The results for contagion of injury assault
suggest that there are contagion effects. All
the models in both panels of Table 3 6.6
are significant, but the effects seem at first
glance to be small. The exponentiated coefficients suggest that assaults increase by less
than 1% for each increment in assaults in the
surrounding tracts for outward contagion or
in the surrounded tracts for inward contagion. Contagion is evident both for gun violence and nongun violence in these models,
suggesting a more ambiguous role of guns.
Although there may be a cross-over contagion effect of gun violence to nongun violence in the surrounding areas, it is unlikely
conceptually and empirically to be any larger
than these observed effects for within-type
contagion.
Several features of this analysis merit further note. First, the coefficients for outward homicide contagion parameters are relatively small and significant only for the
model for African American gun homicide victimization. This is not surprising,
given that homicides are comparatively rare
events. But the primary tale in Table 3 6.5
is one of inward contagion. Consider first
the sheer magnitude of the estimates for
spatial lag in the outward models, and second the large and significant coefficients
for the inward contagion parameters. Taken
together, these findings confirm that the
inward contagion of homicide is more potent
than outward contagion, that a neighborhood is affected more by its adjacent community than it affects that same community.
Though not as dramatic, the same pattern is evident in Table 3 6.6. Here, there is
evidence of both outward and inward contagion of nonlethal assaults. The coefficients
for the outward contagion of assault are not
large, but they are consistently significant.
In relative terms, however, the coefficients
for the inward contagion assault model again
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Table 36.5: Poisson regression results for models of inward and outward contagion of homicide, New York City census tracts, 1985–2 000
(coefficient, t statistic, statistical significance of predictor, exponentiated coefficient)
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Table 36.6: Poisson regression results for models of inward and outward contagion of assault, New York City census tracts, 1990–2 000
(coefficient, t statistic, statistical significance of predictor, exponentiated coefficient)
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indicate that neighborhoods exert less of an
influence over their surrounding communities and instead are more susceptible to
events in those communities.
The presence of gun contagion of both
gun homicides and gun assaults underscores
the importance of guns in the dynamics of
social contagion at the population level. In
an earlier article, Fagan and Davies (2004)
showed that the neighborhoods with the
highest homicide, injury, and gun violence
rates are New York City’s poorest neighborhoods. Those finding were confirmed in
these models in the significant contribution
of the co-variates that express the susceptibility of the poorest neighborhoods to contagion (data available from authors). Accordingly, the corollary finding of socioeconomic
risk as a contributor to the spread of violence captures both the significance of susceptibility and the importance of structural
equivalence in shaping the trajectory of diffusion. That is, the adoption at the population level of gun violence as a means of
social control and exchange was facilitated
by the social concentration of poverty and
of the close social synapses intrinsic to poor
neighborhoods. Accordingly, the social and
spatial clustering of homicide suggests that
it is concentrated within overlapping social
networks in small areas (Fagan & Wilkinson,
1998b).
Social contagion theory suggests that individuals are likely to mutually influence the
behaviors of others with whom they are in
frequent and redundant contact (Bovasso,
1996, p. 1421; Burt, 1987). The social interactions underlying assaultive violence suggest
its spread by social contact (Loftin, 1986),
and, as we show below and in other articles, by specific forms of social interaction
(Wilkinson, 2003 ). We explore these themes
next.

Violent Events, Social Networks, and
Social Contagion
We turn next to an analysis of the individualand group-level processes of social conta-

gion. We identify dynamic social processes
that fuel the social contagion of youth violence. At the heart of this process are the
interactions of individuals within and across
social networks. Violence plays a central role
in the maintenance of organizational boundaries, norms, and cohesion. Two elements in
the contagion of youth violence are conflict
between networks of youths and the role of
violence in resolving conflicts. The violent
events in which these processes unfold and
change over time represent opportunities to
build or maintain status within networks;
in some events, violence is an imperative
with costs when it is not invoked (Wilkinson,
2003 ). Third parties are especially important
in the spread of violence between networks;
third parties can animate or intensify violence once a conflict begins, or they can help
mediate and suppress it. They also convey
the outcomes of violent events to others in
the larger social worlds that surround these
social networks, helping sustain norms and
provide context for the next conflicts that
may arise. The strategic role of guns in these
processes intensifies the dynamics that fuel
the epidemic. In some instances, the presence of guns in events links together persons
and events across time and sustains the processes of social contagion.
This section unfolds in three parts. First,
we discuss the mechanisms through which
violence may spread between social groups
or networks and show how these mechanisms are best understood through the analysis of specific events. Next, the chapter
focuses on the importance of third parties
in violent events. The third section presents
three scenarios that illustrate the intersection of these themes that produce violent
events and often set the stage for future ones.
Violent Events
For any attitude, expectation, behavior, or
virus to be “spread” from person to person or group to group, interpersonal contact is typically required. Exposure can be
direct or indirect. Direct exposure to gun
use and violent behaviors among similarly
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situated networks of young men would likely
increase the risk of transmission. Observations of young men’s decision-making processes in violence use and avoidance provide a window into the processes that shape
interpersonal transmission. Studying violence from an event perspective combines
the study of offenders, victims, and social
context to yield a more complete picture
of its etiology (Meier, Kennedy, & Sacco,
2001). The event perspective considers the
co-production by victim(s), offender(s), and
others of a violence experience. It emphasizes event precursors; the event as it
unfolds; and the aftermath, including reporting, harm, and redress. The event perspective integrates concepts from symbolic
and situational interactionism, routine activity, and rational choice theories. The social
geometry of violent conflict provides clues to
understanding what distinguishes one conflict situation from another or more precisely what distinguishes a nonviolent conflict from a violent conflict (Phillips &
Cooney, 2005 ).
Several investigators have found evidence
that the interplay between the primary
actors determines, in part, the outcome. For
example, Felson and Steadman (1983 ) found
that violent incidents usually began with
identity attacks, were followed by attempts
and failures to influence the opponent, then
included verbal threats, and finally, ended in
physical attack. In a study of ex-offenders,
ex-mental patients, and a sample drawn from
the general population, Felson (1982, 1984)
found a similar pattern. Hughes and Short
(2005 ) confirmed Felson’s earlier findings
with a sample of gang-involved youth.
Similarly, Oliver (1994) used detailed narratives of violent confrontations between
Black males in bars and bar settings. Oliver
employed both participant observation and
interview methods over a 5 -year period
(1983 –1987) to “systematically examine the
social functions of the black bar and how
black males interacted with each other and
with females in this setting.” The sample
consisted of 41 Black men 28 to 45 years
old who frequented the research locations.
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Oliver examined violent behaviors to identify the “rules of engagement” and situational causes of violence in the bar setting.
He observed a five-stage sequence of events
similar to Felson and Steadman’s previous
classification. His work added insights about
violent events from a sample of African
American men, especially with regard to
understanding event closure and the aftermath of violent events. In all of these studies,
victim actions, including retaliation, denial
of claims, and aggressiveness, were found to
be important factors.
A focus on violent events demonstrates
that most violence is a process of social interactions with identifiable rules and contingencies (Campbell, 1986; Felson, 1982; Felson & Steadman, 1983 ; Luckenbill, 1977;
Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989; Oliver, 1994; Polk,
1994; Sommers & Baskin, 1993 ; Wilkinson,
2003 ). Contrary to common wisdom, violent acts can be understood as rational or
purposive behavior. Most experts agree that
rationality is “bounded”; that is, individuals
rarely have all of the information necessary
to make a truly “rational” decision. The likelihood of violence reflects the progression of
decisions across a series of identifiable stages.
Much of this research concludes that there
are contingencies in each stage, shaped by
external influences and social interactions
of the actors. Yet the data have generally
not been available to answer more useful
questions, such as what the contingencies
are, how actors take them into account,
and how they vary as an event progresses
through these stages. Although prior studies provide generalized classifications of violent event stages, a finer-tuned assessment of
the actions and reactions of actors in violent
encounters than is possible from detailed
event narratives will shed new light on the
micro-decisions and contextual influences
across a range of types of violent encounters. Previous studies have generally ignored
information about precipitating actions, as
well as the aftermath of violent events. The
analysis of event stages must also take into
account the heterogeneity of violent events
by examining a wide range of violent acts.
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Studies of Third Parties in Violent Events
Third parties witness or somehow become
involved in an estimated two thirds of
acts of interpersonal violence in the United
States (Planty, 2002). The percentage is even
greater (approximately 73 %) for violence
among young people. Despite the common
nature of third-party presence, researchers
know little about the specific contributions
that third parties make in promoting or preventing the escalation of interpersonal conflict to violence. Previous research concludes
that bystanders and third parties contribute
significantly to the outcome of violent
encounters (see Black, 1993 ; Cooney, 1998;
Decker, 1995 ; Felson, 1982; Felson, Ribner, &
Siegel, 1984; Oliver, 1994; Phillips & Cooney,
2005 ; Wilkinson, 2003 ). For example, Felson (1982, 1993 ) found that, when a dispute occurred between parties of the same
sex, the presence of third parties increased
the likelihood that a verbal disagreement
would turn into a physical fight. Third parties may be viewed both as part of the sociocultural context and as participants in the
co-production of violent events. Largely due
to the work of Donald Black and his followers, theory in the area of third parties
has evolved while empirical studies of thirdparty roles in violence remain rare and unfocused within criminology.
Black’s (1993 ) theoretical work on the
social structure of conflict includes a typology of third parties with specification across
two domains: the nature and degree of the
intervention. He identified 12 third-party
roles, “including five support roles (informer,
adviser, advocate, ally, and surrogate) and
five settlement roles (friendly peacemaker,
mediator, arbitrator, judge, and repressive
peacemaker).” Two other roles that do not
fit within either category are the “negotiator” whose partisanship cross-cuts both sides
and the “healer.” The types are rank ordered
in terms of degree of intervention, with supporting roles organized by the extent of partisanship and settlement roles by the authoritative status of the third parties. Settlement
roles come into play when, according to

Black (1993 , p. 108), “third parties intervene
without taking sides.”
As Black explains, the role of third parties
often depends on personal allegiance (or lack
of it) to the main actors. He argues that audience members allied with either the protagonist or the antagonist may contribute
to the escalation or de-escalation of a dispute through verbal statements, body language, cheering, nonverbal social pressure,
or physical acts of violence. Partisanship and
solidarity are key features of Black’s thesis.
Cooney (1998) elaborated Black’s theory to
include variables on group membership status and articulated hypotheses for four configurations of third-party social locations in
determining their influence over the principals in a conflict situation. They specified the
predictive power of third parties with close
and distant ties to individuals, close and distant ties to groups, cross-cutting ties, and no
ties. Using interviews with 100 incarcerated
offenders of assault or homicide, Phillips and
Cooney (2005 ) found moderate support for
these hypotheses in the first empirical test to
date.
Wilkinson (2007) examined the role of
network peers and third parties as potential
agents of social control in 23 7 violent events
reported by 15 9 urban youth. The study classified third parties by their relational ties to
the focal respondent and his opponent(s).
The study showed that third parties who
were closely tied to the primary participants
were mostly likely to join in the violence,
rather than doing anything to stop it (5 5 %
of the respondent’s associates actively used
violence, whereas 42% of the opponent’s
associates did). Bystanders who were neutral parties toward either side rarely became
involved in the violence itself, although they
actively engaged in some type of social control action in about 20% of events. Bystander
actions typically involved yelling to try to
stop the violence (8%), actions to break up
the conflict (10%), and coming to the aid
of participants nonviolently (3 %). From the
respondents’ perspective, bystanders very
rarely called the police. Third-party presence seems to coincide with police becoming
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involved in both serious and nonserious
events. Events that occurred at night and
without neutral bystanders present were less
likely to come to the attention to police (at
least from the respondents’ experience).
Three Scenarios
Moving beyond these descriptive findings, in
the remainder of this section we examine
how third-party involvement relates to social
contagion in 782 violent events. An eventlevel analysis is the best way to examine how
violence “flows” as a process from individual
to individual, as well as from group to group.
By focusing specifically on the dynamics of
gun violent events reported by 418 New York
City male youth aged 16 to 24, we identify dynamic social processes that fuel the
social contagion of youth violence. Peer network involvement in violent acts takes several forms. First, and most common, is coparticipation or co-offending. The decision
to co-participate happens at any stage as
violent conflicts unfold. These processes are
evident in analyses of the action by actor
sequences of violent events. Peer network
members become actively involved in conflicts that lead to violence through several
avenues: (1) Their involvement in the violent event is strategic and anticipated from
the outset; (2) they come to the aid of an
associate who is losing in the battle; (3 )
they are threatened/offended/disrespected
at some point during the course of observing a dispute unfold; (4) they use violence
either in the moment or after the fact to
obtain justice or right some wrong that was
perpetrated against a group member; or (5 )
they are influenced by gossip about the performance and reputation of violence participants and take up conflicts to restore the
reputation of group members. Peer network
members who are present during disputes
that escalate into violence play different
roles depending on the relationship among
the combatants, weapon type, and injury
outcomes. Three scenarios of violence are
presented that illustrate the nuances of how
violence is diffused across peer networks.
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scenario 1: street corner store and
residential neighborhood
In this scenario, let’s call the respondent
(Aron) and the opponent (Bruce). Aron
argues with Bruce at a neighborhood corner
store over cutting in line. They step outside
and begin to fight. None of the witnesses in
the setting were closely tied to either party,
but they did know both youths by face and
reputation. After about 5 minutes of fighting with fists, Bruce pulls out a razor on
Aron and uses it to slice him across his arm
that Aron had extended to protect his face.
Someone in the audience yells at the youth
to stop before the police are called. Both
youth flee. Aron goes back to his block and
recounts the story to his associates. He rallies
their support for a counterattack by highlighting the ways that his opponent was trying to destroy his attractiveness by scarring
his face and how he disrespected him. After
a few days pass and the group was fueled
by visions of revenge, Aron and four of his
associates armed themselves with handguns
and went to Bruce’s block. Aron’s group
finds Bruce, two guys, and one girl sitting
on the front steps of a neighborhood building. Without verbal warning, Aron pulls his
9 mm from his waist and starts shooting in
the direction of Bruce’s group. Bruce was
caught off guard as he was not expecting
conflict that day. One of Bruce’s companions
pulls out his gun and returns fire. After a few
brief minutes the shooting stops. Two people
are shot–one relatively minor wound to the
leg on Aron’s side and one serious injury to
Bruce’s friend. According to the respondent,
the beef or conflict remains ongoing. Aron
is anticipating a retaliatory attack to avenge
the injury to Bruce’s friend and because he
escalated the beef to a “life and death” issue.

scenario 2: a club at 2 a.m.
Here, Rich, Mike, and four of his associates
go to a club to party and socialize with
females. In the club, Mike sees a girl named
Becky with whom he has a causal relationship. She came to the club with six of
her girlfriends to dance and have fun. Rich
sees Becky dancing and joins her. Rich rubs
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his body up against Becky. Mike observes
the violation directly. Mike informs Rich
of his wrongdoing and asks for an account.
Rich denies wrongdoing, states claim to the
girl, and places blame on Mike. Mike pulls
the girl away from Rich and returns to his
group. Mike’s boys comment on the violation. Mike watches Rich, thinks about the
violation, and is angry. Mike’s boys report
back information about Rich and his boys.
Mike returns to his prior activity. Mike’s girl
goes back to dancing.
The girl’s friends compliment her on
being desired by two guys. Rich talks with
his buddies about the girl and Mike’s capabilities. Both parties wait to see what the
other will do. After some time passes, Rich
begins dancing provocatively with Mike’s
‘girl’ again. Mike is not watching, but hears
about it from his man. Rich’s friends watch
to see if Rich gets the girl. Mike walks up to
Rich and punches him in the face. Rich hits
Mike back. Both sets of friends watch initially. Rich lands some good punches. Mike’s
first friend jumps on Rich. Club security
breaks up the fight, issuing warnings. The
youths go back to drinking and partying.
Mike discusses ways of punishing Rich.
Both sides watch the other. The status of
who “gets” the girl remains open. Both sides
plan to attack at the end of the night. Mike
believed that Rich must have called some
of his friends for additional reinforcements
and to make sure that when Rich got outside he would have a gun available. Mike and
his boys essentially make the same type of
preparations. As soon as Mike moved toward
exiting the club, Rich’s group was preparing
for a gun battle. Mike recalls that his side had
three guns that they retrieved from nearby
stashes, whereas it seemed like the other side
had five or more guns. With more than 20
shots fired, injuries were sustained on both
sides. The police came to the scene, but no
one was arrested.
The injured were transported to the hospital, and one youth from Rich’s side died
at the hospital as a result of this gun event.
Mike heard rumors that Rich had been seen
with Becky following the shoot-out, which
fueled his anger and, in his mind, justified

his need for revenge on Rich. Mike’s boy
suffered serious damage to his knee, which
angered Mike as well. Rumors of revenge for
the death of Rich’s associate were spreading
around. Both sides were on guard and looking for strategic advantage for the next violent event. Mike anticipated that more violence would follow from this event.

scenario 3: a drug stash house near
a street drug spot
Pete and his two associates planned a robbery of a drug stash house manned by a
Dominican crew. Pete got information about
the best day and time to rob the house,
what types of weapons would be used to
defend the stash house, and so on. However, his information was incomplete. When
he and his associates made their armed robbery attempt, they were confronted by additional armed drug dealers who were protecting the drug stash. Pete’s group exchanged
fire with the drug dealers as they fled the
building following a failed robbery attempt.
Pete’s friend Franky almost got shot. Franky
was recognized by the Dominican drug crew.
They came to Pete’s neighborhood to find
and shoot him as revenge for the attempted
robbery incident. Pete describes the situation to our interviewer:
(Pete): They recognized him and shit.
So it was some Dominican kids. They
went to our block and we seen like
this blue Lincoln Towne or Escort or
some shit. We seen this coming around
and coming around. And we was like,
‘yo Franky, I was like you know them
niggas right there man?’ He was like,
‘nah, I was like the niggas got something with us, either they scheming at
us or the niggas ready to hit somebody
else.’ Niggas is sitting up in there either
waiting for somebody or waiting for
us to make a move. He gave a peek
and as soon as he looked, Franky told
me, ‘yo Pete that’s one of them nigga
from that stash house. My hands got
real sweaty, we didn’t have our ghats
on us, My hands got real sweaty. And
it’s like I could front it off and I call you
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from across the way, hey ‘yo what’s up
come here.’ You know what I’m saying
by that time, Franky tells me yo Pete
just run your way and I ran inside the
building. And I said alright I’m going
to run to this Alicia’s house right there
where the gate is at. You know what
I’m saying the car all of the sudden just
right down the block see but we didn’t
want to run as soon as that shit come.
You know what I’m saying as soon as
that car come down slowly, it didn’t do
nothing. The Dominican kid didn’t do
nothing, he just looked at us. And went
right around the block. We was like
that ain’t them, that ain’t them. Give
it like two to three minutes they came
walking, walking, it was like a good little 5 0 yards. And I said, ‘yo, Franky
that’s them right there.’ He was like,
‘where I don’t see the car.’ I said, ‘nah
they on foot right there.’ And Franky
said, ‘oh shit, that’s them.’ When me
and Franky look at them they looked
at us and I see them real quick running
to pull out they ghat. And . . . .they just
started busting. Blah, blah, blah and I
caught my reaction I ran where I said I
was going to run. Franky ran in there
but niggas was just kept blah, blah,
blah and they went after Franky more
than me. They kept just shooting blah,
blah, blah and they ran in the building. That was like oh shit, I jumped
over the gate and I was oh shit. I didn’t
have my ghat or nothing. I was damn
Franky, Franky.
Interviewer: What happened?
(Pete): Really they didn’t caught Franky,
You know what I’m saying they didn’t
get him. But the next day they caught,
they shot him up.
(Interviewer): So they came back the
next day?
(Pete): Early in the morning cause Franky
was out there pitching, early in the
morning. They came back the next day
and they were shooting at him and he
didn’t feel it while he was running but
it cause the bullet went in and out. I
was like you know, everybody was yo
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what happen why they niggas shot up
Franky and shit. We didn’t want to tell
nobody that we went to stash house to
hit. It was like, ‘nah we had beef with
these kids and they came around and
shit like.’
(Interviewer): Why didn’t you want to
tell?
(Pete): Because if he tell niggas that we
hitting other peoples stash houses they
going to probably. God forbid they hit
up the stash house in our block they
the first thing they going to say is ‘yo
I think it was Pete and Franky and Zee
‘cause niggas like hitting stash houses.
Everybody in my block think shystyness, so the first nigga they will probably will is to us and they will probably try to smoke us and it ain’t us. You
know what I’m saying.
The event process can be dissected into
specific stages: anticipatory stage, opening
moves, countermoves and brewing period,
persistence stage, intensification stage, early
violence stage, stewing period, assessment
stage, the casting/recasting stage, and the
retaliatory stage. The examples above
demonstrate that network peers play important roles at almost every stage of a conflict
that escalates into violence. The communication of normative expectations, violence scripts, and violence strategies filters
through direct observation, word of mouth
via rumors, and telling of “war stories.”

Social Contagion and Social Norms
The dynamics of social contagion can be
accommodated within concepts of social
influence and social norms. The social influence concept of behavior borrows from
both economics and sociology (Harcourt,
1998; Lessig, 1995 ). Its economic component suggests that people will act to maximize their utility, whereas its sociological
dimension suggests that conduct is shaped
through direct and vicarious social interactions. A simple version of this nexus suggests
that the choice of conduct is influenced by
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observation and practice of the most effective options. Choices are contextualized as
well, reflecting both the range of available
options and the specific contingencies in
which they are applied (Fagan, 1999).
In the contagious dynamics of violence,
the social meaning of violence is constructed
through the interrelationship of its action
and its context. The social meaning in this
case involves actions (violence) that have
both returns (identity, status, avoidance of
attack) and expectations that, within tightly
packed networks, are unquestioned or normative. Conduct impregnated with social
meaning has influence on the behaviors of
others in immediate proximity. The social
meaning of violence influences the adaptation of behavioral norms, expected responses
(scripts), and even beliefs (memes) about
systems of behavior. Social norms are the
product of repeated events that demonstrate
the meaning and utility of specific forms of
conduct. Social influence thus has a dynamic
and reciprocal effect on social norms (Harcourt, 1998; Lessig, 1995 ). In poor neighborhoods, social interactions are dominated
by street codes, or local systems of justice,
that reward displays of physical domination and offer social approval for antisocial
behavior.
The endogeneity of social contagion to
networks and neighborhoods illustrates the
differences in the two types of epidemics.
The origins of a contagious epidemic that
travels through a population become distal influences on the pathway and dynamics of transmission through populations over
time. The setting or context of contagion
reflects the susceptibility of populations to
the transmission of a socially meaningful
behavior, as well as its exposure to the behavior that has acquired meaning (Fullilove
et al., 1998). This can be true both for fashion and art (Gladwell, 1997; Servin, 1999)
and for problematic social behaviors, such
as drug use (Rowe & Rodgers, 1991), teenage
sexual activity (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993 ),
teenage pregnancy (Crane, 1991), child maltreatment (Coultin, Korbin, Su, & Chow,
1995 ), and violence (Anderson, 1999; Cork,
1999; Fagan, 1999; Loftin, 1986).

Recent applications of social influence
models to crime control emphasize the seminal role of the exogenous influence of “disorder,” in which minor crimes signal to wouldbe criminals that crimes in that area will
be tolerated and not reported (Kelling &
Cole, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). At
first glance, “Broken Windows” suggests that
there is a spread of norms supporting crime
that overwhelm norms of orderliness. The
spread comes from the continuing signals
from disorder. Withdrawal of the signs of disorder will change social norms by allowing
the social influence of orderliness to flourish. Apart from the problematic nature of
this dichotomous categorization of persons
(Harcourt, 1998), Broken Windows medicalizes the conditions of disorder and criminality. It assumes that exposure to the disorder is a constant and recurring process that
signals to the motivated offender that crime
can succeed. Removing the signs of disorder will change social norms by allowing the
social influence of orderliness to flourish. But
this theory is limited by focusing only on the
introduction of the original cues or sources
of crime and relying on the causal effects of
these exogenous factors. This is analogous
to the food poisoning model of epidemics.
Moreover, a literal reading of Broken Windows theory would invite problematic legal
policy responses, such as “social quarantine,”
which have limited efficacy and raise moral
quandaries (Markovits, 2005 ).
The dynamics of social contagion instead
suggest an endogenous process, in which the
spread of social norms occurs through the
everyday interactions of individuals within
networks that are structurally equivalent
and closely packed. Here, the ill grows and
spreads from the inside, often long after the
origins have subsided. This is analogous to
influenza contagion or to the spread of cultural or political thought (Cavalli-Sproza &
Feldman, 1981).
The concept of contagion neutralizes
the categorizations of disorder and order
that theoretically inform the new path of
deterrence. A literal translation of contagion would emphasize guns as a recurring
source of violence and as an agent in the
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transmission of violence norms. Because the
recent epidemic cycle of violence was in
reality a gun homicide epidemic, the case
for gun-oriented policing strategies (Fagan,
2002; Fagan, et al., 1998) is much stronger
than practices based on the more diffuse and
unsupported theory of disorder control and
order-maintenance strategies. Although disorder opposes orderliness, cleanliness, and
sobriety (Harcourt, 2001), violence appears
to travel on vectors quite unrelated to that
particular set of social norms.
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Cook and Ludwig (2004) developed estimates of the effects of gun availability, controlling for any effects due to reverse causation in which the demand for guns among
teenagers may affect prevalence.
One important development is a breakdown
in the age grading of behaviors, in which the
traditional segmentation of younger adolescents from older ones, and behavioral transitions from one developmental stage to the
next, are short-circuited by the strategic presence of weapons. Mixed-age interactions play
an important role in this process. Older adolescents and young adults provide modeling
influences as well as more direct effects. We
found that they exert downward pressure on
others their own age and younger through
identity challenges that, in part, shape the
social identities for both parties. At younger
ages, boys are pushing upward for status by
challenging boys a few years older.
With the exception of the decade influenced
by both the passage of the Volstead Act and
the social and economic instability of the
Great Depression, homicide rates in New
York City varied little. In its 1996 report, the
Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology
reports homicide rates prior to 1985 in 5 -year
intervals. Homicide rates rose from an average of 4.9 in 1916–1920 to 7.6 in 193 1–193 5 ,
and declined to 4.5 by 193 6–1940 (NYC
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
1997).
The 1990 spike for male nongun homicides
most likely reflects the 90 arson homicide
deaths in the Happyland Social Club fire. We
could not adjust the age-, race-, or genderspecific rates for these homicide deaths since
data were not available on their characteristics. The nongun total for 1990 has been
adjusted by deleting 89 of the 90 killings
from the Happyland Social Club fire, in
effect counting that episode as one homicide.
Exceptions include domestic homicides, and
homicides that follow rape. See, Dugan,
Nagin, and Rosenfeld (1999).
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Other indicators, such as drug use among
arrestees recorded in the Drug Use Forecasting System (DUF), also show little relationship with trends in gun homicide rates.
Fagan et al. (1998) show that the incidence of
drug-positive arrestees remained unchanged
throughout the period, and was unrelated
to both firearm and non-firearm homicide
trends.
The male divorce rate also is a consistent
predictor of violence and homicide rates,
and effects are greater for juveniles than
for adults. For example, Messner and Sampson (1991) showed that Black family disruption was substantially related to rates of
murder and robbery involving Blacks. These
findings are consistent with the consistent
findings in the delinquency literature on
the effects of broken homes on social control and guardianship. The effects of male
divorce can be interpreted either as a consequence and correlate of the rise of femaleheaded households, or as an indicator of
weak social control of children who then
are raised primarily by women. Whatever
its meaning, the male divorce rate has positive, clear cut effects on robbery, assault,
rape and homicide (Sampson and Lauritsen,
1994).
A second advantage of the mixed models
approach is that it allows for greater flexibility in specifying the covariance structure
of the data. Specifically, mixed models allow
for the analysis of data where the requisite assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares
regression concerning error term independence are violated. This is particularly important in research involving aggregate units.
Because the neighborhoods and communities are comprised of geographically contiguous census tracts, autocorrelation is inherent
in the data structure and it would be inappropriate to assume a simple covariance structure for these analyses. All of the models
are instead analyzed with an autoregressive
covariance structure.
Additional records are available on deaths
from other means (accidents, disease classifications, self-inflicted violence) to estimate
overall mortality rates by area and by cause.
Accordingly, the database has the capacity
for spatial, temporal, and demographic disaggregation and analysis of several dimensions
of mortality.

References
Abelson, R. P. (1976). Script processing in attitude formation and decision-making. In J. S.
Carroll & J. W. Payne (Eds.), Cognition and
social behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the
script concept. American Psychologist, 3 6, 715 –
729.
Agar, M., & Reisinger, H. S. (2002). A heroin
epidemic at the intersection of histories: The
1960s epidemic among African Americans in
Baltimore. Medical Anthropology, 2 1(2), 115 –
15 6.
Anderson, E. (1994, May). The code of the
streets. Atlantic Monthly, 81–94.
Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the street: Decency,
violence, and the moral life of the inner city. New
York: W. W. Norton.
Bailey, N. T. (1967). Mathematical approach to
biology and medicine. New York: Wiley.
Bailey, N. T. (1975 ). The mathematical theory of
infectious diseases and its applications. London:
Griffin.
Balkin, J. M. (1998). Cultural software: A theory of
ideology. Danbury, CT: Yale University Press.
Baumer, E. (1994). Poverty, crack, and crime: A
cross-city analysis. Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency, 3 1(3 ), 3 11–3 27.
Baumer, E., Lauritsen, J. L., Rosenfeld, R., &
Wright, R. (1998). The influence of crack
cocaine on robbery, burglary, and homicide
rates: A cross-city, longitudinal analysis. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,
3 5 (3 ), 3 16–3 40.
Berman, A. L. (1995 ). Suicide prevention: Clusters and contagion. In A. L. Berman (Ed.), Suicide prevention: Case consultations (pp. 25 –5 5 ).
New York: Springer.
Bingenheimer, J. B., Brennan, R. T., & Earls,
F. J. (2005 ). Firearm violence exposure and
serious violent behavior. Science, 3 08, 13 23 –
13 26.
Black, D. (1993 ). The social structure of right
and wrong. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Blumstein, A. (1995 ). Youth violence, guns, and
the illicit-drug industry. Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology, 86(1), 10–3 6.
Blumstein, A., & Beck, A. J. (1999). Population growth in U.S. prisons, 1980–1996. In M.
Tonry & J. Petersilia (Eds.), Prisons (Vol. 26,
pp. 17–62). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

P1: KAE
05 21845 67Xc3 6

0 5 21 845 67 X

February 27, 2007

social contagion of violence
Bourgois, P. (1995 ). In search of respect: Selling
crack in El Barrio. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bovasso, G. (1996). A network analysis of
social contagion processes in an organizational
intervention. Human Relations, 49(11), 1419–
143 5 .
Brotherton, D., & Barrios, L. (2004). The almighty
Latin king and queen nation: Street politics and
the transformation of a New York City gang.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Bryk, A. S., & Raudenbush, S. W. (1992). Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data
analysis methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and
innovation: Cohesion versus structural equivalence. American Journal of Sociology, 92 (6),
1287–13 3 5 .
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Campbell, A. (1986). The streets and violence.
In A. Campbell & J. Gibbs (Eds.), Violent
transactions: The limits of personality. New
York: Blackwell.
Cavalli-Sproza, L. L., & Feldman, M. W. (1981).
Cultural transmission and evolution: A quantitative approach. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chin, K. (1996). Chinatown gangs: Extortion,
enterprise, and ethnicity. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Coleman, J. S., Katz, E., & Menzel, H.
(1966). Medical innovation; A diffusion study.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Cook, P. J., & Laub, J. H. (1998). The unprecedented epidemic in youth violence. Crime and
Justice, 2 4, 27–64.
Cook, P. J., & Ludwig, J. (2004). Does gun prevalence affect teen gun carrying after all? Criminology, 42 , 27–5 4.
Cooney, M. (1998). Warriors and peacemakers:
How third parties shape violence. New York.
New York University Press.
Cork, D. (1999). Examining space-time interaction in city-level homicide data: Crack markets
and the diffusion of guns among youth. Journal
of Quantitative Criminology, 15 (4), 3 79–406.
Coulton, C. J., Korbin, J. E., Su, M., & Chow,
J. (1995 ). Community-level factors and child
maltreatment rates. Child Development, 66,
1262–1276.
Crane, J. (1991). The epidemic theory of ghettos and neighborhood effects on dropping out

1:3

719

and teenage childbearing. American Journal of
Sociology, 96(5 ), 1226–125 9.
Curtis, R. (1998). The improbable transformation
of inner-city neighborhoods: Crime, violence,
drugs, and youth in the 1990s. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88, 123 3 –1276.
Decker, S. H. (1995 ). Reconstructing homicide
events: The role of witnesses in fatal encounters. Journal of Criminal Justice, 2 3 (5 ), 43 9–
45 0.
Delgado, R. (1985 ). ‘Rotten social background’:
Should the criminal law recognize a defense
of severe environmental deprivation? Law and
Inequality, 3 , 9–90.
Eckberg, D. L. (1995 ). Estimates of early
twentieth-century U.S. homicide rates: An
econometric forecasting approach. Demography, 3 2 (1), 1–16.
Egan, D. J., & Robinson, D. O. (1979). Models of
a heroin epidemic. American Journal of Psychiatry, 13 6, 1162–1167.
Elliott, D. S., Wilson, W. J., Huizinga, D., Sampson, R. J., Elliott, A., & Rankin, B. (1996).
The effects of neighborhood disadvantage on
adolescent development. Journal of Crime and
Delinquency, 3 3 , 3 89–426.
Fagan, J. (1989). The social organization of drug
use and drug dealing among urban gangs.
Criminology, 2 7 (4), 5 01–5 3 6.
Fagan, J. (1990). Intoxication and aggression.
Drugs and Crime – Crime and Justice: An
Annual Review of Research, 13 , 241–3 20.
Fagan, J. (1992). Drug selling and licit income in
distressed neighborhoods: The economic lives
of street level drug users and dealers. In A.
Harrel & G. Peterson (Eds.), Drugs, crime and
social isolation (pp. 99–146). Washington, DC:
Urban Institute Press.
Fagan, J. (1993 ). The political economy of drug
dealing among urban gangs. In R. Davis, A.
Lurigio, & D. P. Rosenbaum (Eds.), Drugs and
community. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas.
Fagan, J. (1999). Context and culpability of adolescent violence. Virginia Review of Social Policy and Law, 6(3 ), 101–174.
Fagan, J. (2002). Policing guns and youth violence.
Future of Children, 12 (2), 13 3 –15 1.
Fagan, J., & Chin, K. (1989). Initiation into crack
and powdered cocaine: A tale of two epidemics. Contemporary Drug Problems, 16(4),
5 79–617.
Fagan, J., & Chin, K. (1991). Social processes of
initiation into crack cocaine. Journal of Drug
Issues, 2 1, 43 2–466.

P1: KAE
05 21845 67Xc3 6

72 0

0 5 21 845 67 X

February 27, 2007

1:3

jeffrey fagan, deanna l. wilkinson, and garth davies

Fagan, J., & Davies, G. (2004). Natural history of
neighborhood violence. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 2 0(2), 127–147.
Fagan, West, & Holland 2003
Fagan, J., & Wilkinson, D. L. (1997). Firearms and
youth violence. In D. Stoff, J. Brieling, & J. D.
Maser (Eds.), Handbook of antisocial behavior.
New York: Wiley.
Fagan, J., & Wilkinson, D. L. (1998a). Guns, youth
violence, and social identity in inner cities.
Crime and Justice, 2 4, 105 –188.
Fagan, J., & Wilkinson, D. L. (1998b). Situational contexts of adolescent violence. Revue
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